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After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the
Internet of Things, and the Busts of
Data-Security and Privacy
Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr.*
This Article addresses the impact that the lack of oversight of
the Internet of Things has on digital privacy. While the Internet of
Things is but one vehicle for technological innovation, it has
created a broad glimpse into domestic life, thus triggering several
privacy issues that the law is attempting to keep pace with. What
the Internet of Things can reveal is beyond the control of the
individual, as it collects information about every practical aspect
of an individual’s life, and provides essentially unfettered access
into the mind of its users. This Article proposes that the federal
government and the state governments bend toward consumer
protection while creating a cogent and predictable body of law
surrounding the Internet of Things. Through privacy-by-design or
self-help, it is imperative that the Internet of Things—and any of its
unforeseen progeny—develop with an eye toward safeguarding
individual privacy while allowing technological development.
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INTRODUCTION
“Because, you know, resilience—if you think of it
in terms of the Gold Rush, then you’d be pretty
depressed right now because the last nugget of gold
would be gone. But the good thing is, with
innovation, there isn’t a last nugget. Every new
thing creates two new questions and two new
opportunities.” – Jeff Bezos1
In 1969, in an attempt to send the first electronic transmission
through an early-model computer, University of California, Los
Angeles students attempted to type in the word “login” but the
computer crashed after typing in the second letter.2 Tim BernersLee would soon after develop what we know today as the Internet.3
Less than fifty years later, electronic transmissions are capable of
complex and high-speed communication. Amidst the development
of the Internet, the legal system has attempted to keep pace with
the ever-growing and dynamic nature of the technological boom.
All things Internet and electronic have provided a boon to society
while also complicating related legal issues. In the relatively short
life of the Internet, the legal system has attempted to adapt and
address new privacy concerns such as: personal computers in the
1980s; the Internet in the 1990s; mobile apps at the beginning of
the 2000s; and currently, the Internet of Things (“IoT”),4 with
1

Jeff Bezos, Founder & CEO, Amazon.com, Address at the TED2003 Conference:
The Electricity Metaphor for the Web’s Future (Feb. 2003), https://www.ted.com/talks
/jeff_bezos_on_the_next_web_innovation/transcript?language=en
[https://perma.cc/CG2W-NN6Y].
2
See Daily Mail Reporter, Pictured: The Fridge-Sized Computer that Sent the Very
First Email [Fourty] Years Ago . . . But Crashed After Just Two Letters Were Received,
DAILY MAIL (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1224100
/Internets-40th-birthday-First-email-crashes-just-letters.html
[https://perma.cc/SQ2K-H4RG].
3
See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 2–3 (1999).
4
See Stephen Lawson, Look Before You Leap: [Four] Hard Truths About IoT,
PCWORLD (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3184327/internetof-things/look-before-you-leap-4-hard-truths-about-iot.html
[https://perma.cc/QBK5UL2M]; see also Maureen Dowd, Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the A.I.
Apocalypse, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/elonmusk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-space-x?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosam [https://perma.cc/4K82-2RLX] (“‘Your
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artificial intelligence (“AI”) hot on its heels.5 Nevertheless, as
technology evolves into the vast and unknown, IoT, data-security,
and privacy issues remain. And in the IoT, these privacy issues are
exacerbated because of the blurred lines between digital and
physical infrastructures.6
What the IoT can reveal is beyond the control of the individual,
as it collects information about every practical aspect of an
individual’s life, and provides essentially unfettered access into the
mind of its user.7 In their seminal work on privacy, Samuel Warren
and Justice Brandeis determined that the right to privacy was the
“right to be let alone.”8 The right to privacy was essentially the
right to control your own personal information.9 In a recent survey
phone and your computer are extensions of you, but the interface is through finger
movements or speech, which are very slow.’ With a neural lace inside your skull you
would flash data from your brain, wirelessly, to your digital devices or to virtually
unlimited computing power in the cloud. ‘For a meaningful partial-brain interface, I think
we’re roughly four or five years away.’” (quoting Elon Musk CEO and founder of
SpaceX, CEO and co-founder of Tesla, CEO and founder of Neuralink, and co-Chairman
of OpenAI)). Perhaps in the near future AI will guide the digital privacy debate.
5
See Joseph Jerome, Why Artificial Intelligence May Be the Next Big Privacy Trend,
IAPP (Oct. 10, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/why-artificial-intelligence-may-be-thenext-big-privacy-trend/ [https://perma.cc/5TUB-D6TU].
6
See Lawson, supra note 4 (“[A] Technalysis survey last year found operations
departments were in charge of IoT projects more often than IT shops.”
(citation omitted)).
7
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s sardonic riff on the state of legal scholarship, Kant
may be an appropriate—if not highly relevant—entry point for this area of law. See A
Conversation with Chief Justice John Roberts (C-SPAN television broadcast June 25,
2011),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts
[https://perma.cc/XQ3X-EH5X] (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the
first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in eighteenth-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great
interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.”); see also
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 17–21 (F. Max Müller trans., 2d ed. Rev.
1922) (explaining that the mind structures experiences of reality, while the rules dictating
reality are intrinsic to the mind and, accordingly, if these rules are identified then reality
can be decoded).
8
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193, 195, 201 (1890). Their analysis could not foresee the intrusiveness of
technological devices that would pervade contemporary society. Had they done so, then
perhaps they would have placed a premium on the intellectual activities ultimately at the
center of what is to be protected, rather than the act of intrusion itself that society would
not accept as reasonable.
9
See id.
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by the Pew Research Center, ninety-three percent of adults said
that being in control of who can get their information is important,
while ninety percent said that controlling what information is
collected about them is also important.10 Nevertheless, billions of
people willingly hand over their personal information every day
without understanding the effects that this may have on their
own privacy.11
This Article addresses the impact of the lack of oversight over
the IoT, and the data-security and privacy issues that the IoT
implicates. Part I provides a brief background of and defines the
IoT, and discusses its interaction with data collection. Part II
explains the current state of IoT privacy regulations under the
federal framework, along with a discussion of California’s lead on
data privacy issues. Additionally, Part II briefly discusses a few
successful attempts by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to
hold IoT developers accountable for security breaches. Part III
discusses recent data-security issues and potential future harms to
privacy in the IoT. In particular, this Part discusses recent IoT
devices that have been hacked and the resulting injuries. Part IV
discusses data-breach notifications, and the need for the FTC to—
at minimum—include a privacy-by-design aspect in overseeing
IoT devices. This Part also discusses self-help methods that
consumers may apply to protect their data and privacy, and the
potential impact that self-help might have on federal regulations.
I.
A HISTORY OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS
The IoT is composed of mostly unsecure devices, which
provide a wellspring of information about its users.12 This Part
10
Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015
/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/M75G-ADT9].
11
See, e.g., Ben Popper & Nikki Erlick, Facebook Is Closing in on [Two] Billion
Monthly Users, VERGE (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:14 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2017/2/1
/14474534/facebook-earnings-q4-fourth-quarter-2016 [https://perma.cc/E7TU-6FER].
12
See Lucian Constantin, IoT Malware Starts Showing Destructive Behavior,
PCWORLD (Apr. 7, 2017, 11:37 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3188484/security
/iot-malware-starts-showing-destructive-behavior.html [https://perma.cc/B4R7-8HUF].
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provides a brief background of the IoT, defines some of its
pertinent characteristics, and raises key issues on how the IoT
relates to data collection and privacy.
A. A Brief Background on the IoT
Technologist Kevin Ashton claimed he coined the term “the
Internet of Things” in 1999 during a presentation to Proctor and
Gamble, in which he stated that adding radio-frequency
identification (“RFID”) and other sensors to everyday objects will
lay the foundation of a new age of machine perception, creating an
Internet of Things.13 At the time, it seems that Ashton was
primarily discussing the use of RFIDs in an industrial setting, since
the idea of a networked manufacturing process dates back to the
1980s.14 The development and ubiquity of RFIDs precipitated the
growth of a larger growing body of interconnected devices for
consumer use, where all devices are now becoming linked within a
network.15 Thus, “[w]hat makes the IoT dynamic is the ability to
control products, machines and systems over the internet.”16
It appears that the digital revolution has come full-circle. The
IoT is not only a new realm unto itself; it also affects how the
13

See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009),
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/JFP6-83SV]; see also
CLARITY INNOVATIONS, INTERNET OF THINGS 5 (2016), https://www.clarity-innovations
.com/sites/default/files/publications/clarity-iot-in-education.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ETV-M5CF].
14
See A Sea of Sensors, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node
/17388356 [https://perma.cc/6DPU-384T] (“The concept of the ‘internet of things’ dates
back to the late 1980s, when researchers at Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC) in Silicon
Valley imagined a future in which the virtual and the real world would be connected.”);
see also, e.g., Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the
Data?, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695, 695–96 (2006) (discussing
RFID’s application to managing commercial inventory and manufacturing).
15
See, e.g., Alexandre Santos et al., Internet of Things and Smart Objects for MHealth Monitoring and Control, 16 PROCEDIA TECH. 1351, 1352 (2014) (“RFID[] is used
in many applications . . . . There are several methods of identification, although the most
common is a microchip able to store a serial number that identifies the person, object or
thing. Using electronic devices that emit radio frequency signals, it is possible to perform
an automatic capture of data, or a tag, from a reader.”).
16
H. Michael O’Brien, The Impact of the Smart Home Revolution on Product Liability
and Fire Cause Determinations, WILSON ELSER (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www
.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Client_Alerts/product_liability_fire_science_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3DH-LR6L].
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Internet works.17 The Internet was once only comprised of codes in
the abstract—ephemerally stored in the cloud.18 However, the
Internet has now manifested itself into the physical world in the
form of networked objects also known as the IoT.19 Courts and
legislators are failing to address the appropriate level of oversight
of developing technologies with privacy implications, such as IoT
devices entering the market. Notably, this Article does not focus on
one single device, and generally discusses the privacy issues that
the IoT creates.
B. The IoT Defined
At its most basic definition, the IoT is simply objects with
sensors networked together that are capable of communicating
with one another.20 The IoT is synonymous with smart cities,
driverless cars, and all other forms of interconnected objects and
wearables.21 Born of innovation, these networked objects have
17

Pierre DeBois, How the Internet of Things is Reshaping Search, CMS WIRE (Mar.
20, 2017), http://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/how-the-internet-of-things-isreshaping-search/ [https://perma.cc/2KJP-CNFZ] (“The quality of queries from
IoTQR”—which is defined as the “search results based on the query phrases consumers
say to a smart device”—“differs significantly from a search engine results page (SERP),
making marketers reconsider how digital media should align to query phrases as well as
with online search patterns of keywords.”).
18
See David Delony, The [Five] Programming Languages that Built the Internet,
TECHOPEDIA (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.techopedia.com/2/25666/internet/the-6programming-languages-that-built-the-internet [https://perma.cc/5456-X55R] (explaining
how the Internet was built on coding languages). See generally Steve Johnson, What is
Digital Coding?, TECHWALLA, https://www.techwalla.com/articles/what-is-digital-coding
[https://perma.cc/A9S2-YUVR] (last visited Aug. 24, 2017) (discussing the basics of
digital coding and the binary system of zeros and ones that comprise the fundamental
language of digital information).
19
Luigi Atzori et al., The Internet of Things: A Survey, 54 COMPUTER
NETWORKS 2787, 2787 (2010) (“The basic idea of this concept is the pervasive presence
around us of a variety of things or objects—such as . . . RFID tags, sensors, actuators,
mobile phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing schemes, are able to interact with
each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach common goals.”); see also Jacob
Morgan, A Simple Explanation of the ‘Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internetthings-that-anyone-can-understand/#1910b3fb1d09
[https://perma.cc/3DK2-W3RA]
(providing a visual aid to illustrate the interconnectivity of the IoT).
20
See Atzori et al., supra note 19.
21
See Jason Tanz, The CIA Leak Exposes Tech’s Vulnerable Future, WIRED (Mar. 8,
2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cia-leak-exposes-techs-vulnerable-
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developed to improve the lives of their users.22 Additionally, the
technology provides for a real-time application of data processing,
data storage, and data analysis.23 These objects gather and collect
data, for example, in order to remind you that it is time to take your
pills.24 On a larger scale, the so-called Industrial IoT is
streamlining industrial production across the world.25 However,
what remains unclear is the depth and breadth of how these
efficient objects will impact privacy.26
In order to anticipate the IoT’s impact on daily life, a basic
understanding of its mechanics is necessary. IoT devices share data
using familiar network protocols such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, mobile
phone networks, and specialized networks—as well as the global
Internet.27 IoT devices are embedded with RFIDs in order to share

future/ [https://perma.cc/XVV2-NMZX] (“Whether you call it the ‘Internet of Things’ or
the ‘Internet of Everything’ or the ‘Third Wave’ or the ‘Programmable World,’ the longpredicted moment when connectivity becomes as ubiquitous as electricity is nearly
upon us.”).
22
Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case Study: Internet of Things (IoT), BERKMAN
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 3 (2012), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/97248
[https://perma.cc/92EV-U5QE] (“The grand vision of the [IoT] is a world of networked
intelligent objects. Every car, refrigerator, and carton of milk would be distinguished with
its RFID chip, and they communicate constantly and seamlessly to create a much more
efficient world.”).
23
See Leon Hounshell, Forecasting Profitable Models for the Internet of Things,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/03/23
/forecasting-profitable-models-for-the-internet-of-things/#1f2d5cf33e94
[https://perma.cc/52AW-J32S].
24
See DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE INTERNET
OF THINGS 8–9 (2014) (discussing a pill bottle called a GlowCap that syncs to the Internet
to remind patients to take their pills).
25
See Kipp Bradford, The Industrial Internet of Things, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2014, 8:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oreillymedia/2014/02/05/the-industrial-internet-ofthings/#7da766581c39 [https://perma.cc/DXM7-C9YX].
26
See generally RICHARD RUTLEDGE ET AL., GA. INST. OF TECH., DEFINING THE
INTERNET OF DEVICES: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS (2014), https://smartech
.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/52020/plsc2014-IoD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76TX-Y246].
27
See Ian Brown, GSR Discussion Paper: Regulation and the Internet of Things 3, 6
(June 25, 2015) (working paper) (on file with International Telecommunication Union),
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2015/Discussion
_papers_and_Presentations/GSR_DiscussionPaper_IoT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/558EMFMS] (“Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication is used to refer to
communication directly between IoT devices, often via cellular networks.”).
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data.28 RFIDs are then connected to networked objects such as
“parking meters, thermostats, cardiac monitors, tires, roads, car
components, to supermarket shelves and many other types of
physical object.”29 RFIDs are also being connected to what most
would already consider a private object.30 Driverless cars are
quickly being developed with complex sensors that track and
analyze a user’s driving habits.31 There are already plans to
connect smartphones to parking grids in order to make parking
efficient while maximizing public spaces.32 In short, the IoT
has arrived.
Unfortunately, many IoT devices are hastily put on the market
and are not engineered to protect data security.33 IoT developers
are rushing their devices to market before properly ensuring that
their devices are stable and secure.34 Particularly, consumer-goods
manufacturers—not computer software or hardware firms—often

28

See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 31–35 (2010) (discussing two types of RFIDS, active and
passive—active RFIDs are internally powered, and can communicate over longer
distances and up to one thousand meters while travelling at upwards of one hundred miles
per hour, whereas a passive RFID is not internally powered and is only engaged when a
reader is close in enough in proximity).
29
Brown, supra note 27, at 3.
30
See John Kennedy, Intimate of Things: Smart Vibrator Gets Hacked at Def Con 24,
SILICON REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/smartvibrator-hacked-def-con-24 [https://perma.cc/5F36-3EQC]
(discussing a very private, if not very intimate, interconnected object named the “WeVibe,” a sex toy that is able to send information about its users, like the temperature of
the device, each time a user changes intensity levels on the device).
31
See Mike Ramsey, On the Road to Driverless Cars, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2017, 2:52
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2017/01/26/on-the-road-to-driverlesscars/#5d5c1b8617ed [https://perma.cc/QX76-VUFH].
32
See, M. Ramya et al., Parking Slot Availability Check and Booking System over IOT,
1 ASIAN J. APPLIED SCI. & TECH. 149, 149–52 (2017) (discussing their design to improve
and implement “Wi-Fi based smart car parking services in modern cities” to maximize
public space and reduce waiting time).
33
See Alisa Valudes Whyte, Trending from CES: IoT Companies Avoiding Security
Are Putting Their Survival at Stake, HUFFPOST (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:53 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trending-from-ces-iot-companies-avoidingsecurity_us_5888a8e2e4b04251e621fa88 [https://perma.cc/4ARX-DGY8].
34
See Thibaut Rouffineau, Three Flaws at the Heart of IoT Security, UBUNTU
INSIGHTS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://insights.ubuntu.com/2017/03/20/three-flaws-at-theheart-of-iot-security/ [https://perma.cc/8GAY-ZEQT].
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manufacture many IoT devices.35 With little IoT developer
oversight, and eroding federal regulations before they have even
been established,36 it is no wonder that the largest distributed
denial of service attack (“DDoS”) in history was perpetrated
through a series of IoT devices.37 A DDoS is a form of extortion by
hackers, whereby a server is flooded with artificial traffic, bringing
services to a screeching halt.38 Accordingly, the IoT’s rush to
market and inherently flawed security poses several hazards to
data-security and privacy.39
C. The IoT and Data Collection
In their seminal work on privacy, Samuel Warren and Justice
Brandeis characterized an individual’s privacy interest as the “right
to be let alone,”40 and defined this fundamental right in the context
of “[r]ecent inventions” that threatened privacy.41 “Recent
inventions” such as the IoT, are potentially more pernicious and
devastating to an individual’s “right to be let alone,”42 primarily
because of the depth and breadth of information that IoT devices
gather and analyze.
35

Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 94 (2014).
36
See, e.g., S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (disapproving 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274
(Dec. 2, 2016)).
37
See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are DoS and DDoS Attacks?, WIRED (Jan.
16, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/hacker-lexicon-what-are-dos-andddos-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/2JYU-W934] (discussing DDoS attacks); see also, e.g.,
Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive East Coast Internet Outage,
WIRED (Oct. 21, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddosdns-dyn/ [https://perma.cc/6LKM-X2GT]; infra Part III for an in-depth discussion of a
recent DDoS attack through IoT devices.
38
See Zetter, supra note 37.
39
See Tom Pageler, Is Everything Hackable in the Internet of Things?, FORBES (Apr.
5, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/05/iseverything-hackable-in-the-internet-of-things/#4bab849e3084 [https://perma.cc/WPS596HR] (discussing the lack of basic security controls for IoT devices).
40
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 193, 195.
41
Id. at 195–96 (explaining that particularly threatening to privacy were the then new
“business methods” whereby gossip had “become a trade”).
42
See id. at 205 (“The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an
inviolate personality.”).
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These IoT devices are engaging in “machine learning,” by
quickly identifying patterns as IoT users engage with the devices.43
And even though consumers may not be aware, many of the
devices already in use—and not necessarily associated with the
IoT—are in fact capable of being tracked through unique
identifiers embedded in devices such as cellphones.44 By design, it
appears that the IoT is bound to be a complex system of
surveillance.45 For example, “[i]f the information stored on an
RFID-tagged consumer item is unique to the particular item, it can
be used to distinguish the person carrying the item from all other
persons and thus be used to track the person carrying the RFIDtagged item.”46
Some scholars are skeptical of the blind-charge toward
unfettered data collection.47 Professor Neil M. Richards suggests,
“Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal
information that can be processed, but because of the ways data in
one area can be linked to other areas and analyzed to produce new
inferences and findings.”48 Nevertheless, scholars can agree that
one problem is not necessarily the accuracy of the data collected,
43

See PHILLIP N. HOWARD, PAX TECHNICA: HOW THE INTERNET OF THINGS MAY SET US
FREE OR LOCK US UP 141 (2015) (defining machine learning as the process of how
categories emerge from the data sets, rather than the old way of interpreting statistical
data, which involved a hypothesis that was tested and crudely based on intuitive labels of
factors thought to be effective to infer questions).
44
See Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1099 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1814, 1837 (2011).
45
See Nancy J. King, When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped—Finding E.U.-U.S.
Solutions to Protect Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 107, 143–44 (2008) (discussing unique identifiers attributed
to individual devices that create a system of surveillance).
46
Id. at 143.
47
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 339, 345 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-RevOnline-339.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q6V-7LCP] (urging caution in overestimating the
benefits of Big Data, relative to the potential harms).
48
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1939
(2013) (providing a more in-depth discussion and analysis of Big Data, which is defined
as large volumes of structured or unstructured data that organizations can potentially
mine and analyze).
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but the accuracy of the inferences drawn based upon the Big Data
collected.49 Professor Ryan Calo has even gone as far as to suggest
that the aggregation and concentration of such private individual
data could lead to what he calls “digital market manipulation.”50
“Digital market manipulation” could allow firms to “increasingly
be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability in consumers—
leading to actual and perceived harms that challenge the limits of
consumer protection law . . . which regulators can scarcely
ignore.”51 Notwithstanding scholarly interpretation of the Big Data
conundrum, immense data gathering and data storage is a source of
collective anxiety.52
A major concern with Big Data regarding the IoT’s privacy
implications is that an individual’s private information could be
used to predict future behavior after it is aggregated and
analyzed.53 For example, “[s]ensor data capture incredibly rich
nuance[s] about who we are, how we behave, what our tastes are,
and even our intentions. Once filtered through ‘Big Data’
analytics, these data are the grist for drawing revealing and often
unexpected inferences about our habits, predilections, and
personalities.”54 Nevertheless, even with the growing concern over
the IoT’s impact on privacy, the Acting Chairman of the FTC,
Maureen Ohlhausen, is pushing for IoT providers to self-regulate
as part of the Trump administration’s move toward complete
deregulation.55 In fact, the push toward deregulation has already
49

See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 270–71 (2013) (“Inaccurate,
manipulative, or discriminatory conclusions may be drawn from perfectly innocuous,
accurate data.”).
50
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 (2014).
51
Id.
52
See Quentin Hardy, Rethinking Privacy in an Era of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2012, 9:55 AM), http:// bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/rethinking-privacy-in-an-eraof-big-data [https://perma.cc/AH3R-97V7] (“Privacy is a source of tremendous tension
and anxiety in Big Data . . . . It’s a general anxiety that you can’t pinpoint, this odd
moment of creepiness.”).
53
See Peppet, supra note 35, at 90.
54
Id.
55
See Sam Thielman, Acting Federal Trade Commission Head: Internet of Things
Should Self-Regulate, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2017/mar/14/federal-trade-commission-internet-things-regulation
[https://perma.cc/97LV-XFPN].
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begun.56 Based on the current state of the regulatory framework
governing data-security and digital privacy, allowing
manufacturers to self-regulate as the IoT develops could harm
consumers and the IoT technology.57 Accordingly, further
deregulation, along with consumers failing to secure their
information, could lead to a catastrophic breakdown in data
security and privacy protections.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF IOT REGULATIONS ON DATASECURITY AND PRIVACY
Our current privacy laws are collected in federal and state
legislation; administrative agencies; and common-law actions in
tort, property, and contract law.58 This Part discusses federal and
California regulations that govern digital privacy and security with
respect to their impact on the IoT. Alarmingly, the trend toward
deregulation is already taking hold.
Although consumers may have remedies in tort59 or contract
law,60 these remedies may not provide proper relief.61 For example,
“[t]he current U.S. legal framework for cybersecurity is a
56

See infra Part II.
See Gareth Corfield, [U.S.] Regulator Looks at Internet of Things Regulation, Looks
Away, REGISTER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/14/us
_ftc_wont_start_internet_of_things_regulation/ [https://perma.cc/7S3L-DEEK].
58
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 70–88 (Univ. N.C. Press
1st ed. 1995).
59
See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing
Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6,
102 (2015) (predicting that “[i]t would not be surprising to see future privacy-related
controversies give rise to more legal actions involving the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion”); Alexander H. Tran, Note, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in
Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 263, 279–80 (2017) (arguing that
public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion might be adequate tort
claims for IoT-related harms).
60
See Stacy-Ann Elvey, Hybrid Transactions and the Internet of Things: Goods,
Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 158 (2017) (providing a thorough
analysis of IoT’s possible breach of warranty claims—for instance, some IoT devices
sold to consumers contain hidden data monitoring features that are beyond the device’s
ordinary purpose, thus giving rise to a breach of warranty claim).
61
Cf. Kevin L. Miller, What We Talk About When We Talk About “Reasonable
Cybersecurity”: A Proactive and Adaptive Approach, 90 FLA. B.J. 23, 23
(Sept.–Oct. 2016).
57
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patchwork, consisting of a number of overlapping federal
standards aimed at regulated entities in various sectors, state cyberbreach notification laws, state statutes, and caselaw arising from
consumer’s actions against companies.”62 Further, in federal
courts, privacy claims in tort law must meet the requirements for
Article III standing.63 Additionally, if IoT related privacy issues
were resolved under a tort theory like traditional privacy claims,
the courts would be flooded with innumerable claims against IoT
developers. And although a potential deluge of litigation might
correct the current lackluster focus on security in the developing
IoT market, it could take decades for such claims to travel through
the state courts before developing into a cogent and predictable
body of law.64 Accordingly, the FTC and other agencies that
regulate digital privacy are best suited to develop this emerging
area of law, as discussed at length in the following section.
A. Federal Regulations of Data-Security and Privacy
In March 2017, a joint resolution in the House and Senate
struck down Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
Chairman Tom Wheeler’s regulation to protect Internet users’

62

Id.
The federal courts are of limited jurisdiction: claims must allege an injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, placing a
heavy burden on the plaintiff, and thus creating another barrier to streamlining privacyrelated issues related to the IoT. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1147–50 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because it was highly speculative
that the government would in fact target plaintiff’s communications, and thus there was
no injury-in-fact); see also Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (holding that telecom subscribers did not have standing to challenge that the
government’s bulk data collection program—as authorized under the Patriot Act—
violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches because
plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they were, in fact, targeted for surveillance). But see
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that a class
action had Article III standing, where the insured party suffered economic harm through
having to purchase credit-monitoring services to prevent identity theft and fraud, which
was not too speculative).
64
Cf. Andrew Meola, The FAA Rules and Regulations You Need to Know to Keep
Your Drone Use Legal, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2017, 1:12 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/drones-law-faa-regulations-2017-7
[https://perma.cc
/T3CA-YFGR] (providing data indicating that drone regulation across the United States
is nearing a decade long progression toward a cogent and predictable body of law).
63
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personal information.65 The now failed FCC regulation would have
required Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)66 to inform consumers
what information was being collected and how that information
was being used or shared.67 The repeal’s backers argued that the
federal regulation would disadvantage ISPs in favor of other datacollecting companies like Google or Facebook—which the FTC
oversees.68 The FTC and the FCC are two distinct regulatory
administrative agencies. Generally, the FTC oversees and approves
large mergers,69 regulates competition, and ensures consumer
protection.70 On the other hand, while the FCC regulates similar
activity, the FCC does not focus on consumer protection.71 The
FCC is primarily engaged in “promoting competition, innovation
and investment in broadband services and facilities.”72 Thus, the
responsibility of online privacy regulation is likely to fall squarely
on the FTC.73
65

See S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (“That Congress disapproves the rule
submitted by the Federal Communications Commission relating to ‘Protecting the
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’ (81 Fed.
Reg. 87,274 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64)), and such rule shall have
no force or effect.”).
66
Internet Service Provider (ISP), TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com
/definition/2510/internet-service-provider-isp [https://perma.cc/F84K-XZ8L] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2017) (“An [ISP] is a company that provides customers with Internet access.
Data may be transmitted using several technologies, including dial-up, DSL, cable
modem, wireless or dedicated high-speed interconnects.”).
67
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 81 Fed. Reg. at 87,275.
68
Justin Cosgrove, US Senate Votes to Repeal Internet Privacy Rules, JURIST (Mar.
24, 2017, 10:32 AM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/03/us-senate-votes-torepeal-internet-privacy-rules.php [https://perma.cc/EW9E-NPVN].
69
See, e.g., Colin Lecher, The FTC Says It Won’t Stop Amazon from Buying Whole
Foods, VERGE (Aug. 23, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/23
/16193542/ftc-amazon-whole-foods [https://perma.cc/2LPG-KLQ6] (showing how the
FTC approved Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods).
70
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
[https://perma.cc/NX5S-ZDAQ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
71
See What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/whatwe-do [https://perma.cc/49WG-KKBG] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
72
Id.
73
Caleb Chen, Today, Senators Will Vote to Allow ISPs to Sell Your Internet History
and End FCC Online Privacy Rules, PRIVACY NEWS ONLINE (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2017/03/today-senators-will-vote-allow-ispssell-internet-history-end-fcc-online-privacy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/DFU9-9S6Z] (“The
resolution, if passed . . . would pass the responsibility of online privacy regulation from
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Still, the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) may be
the best way to provide consumer relief.74 Generally, the FTC has
the authority to “gather and compile information concerning, and
to investigate from time to time the organization, business,
conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”75
Primarily, the FTC oversees business that affects commerce
through unfair practices.76 The FTC Act is intended to prevent
businesses “from using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”77 “Unfair” practices are defined as those that
“cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”78 Whereas a deceptive practice involves any
misrepresentation of fact to any portion of the population.79
Though Federal legislation may regulate privacy matters in the
IoT, the existing federal regulatory framework is scattered among
several agencies.80 For example, the Fair Crediting Report Act
the FCC onto the FTC . . . .”); Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the
FCC’s Landmark Internet Privacy Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-votedto-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/?utm_term=.f5675f7787aa
[https://perma.cc/ADS4-R42G] (stating that one critic discussing the bill remarked that
“although consumers can easily abandon sites whose privacy practices they don’t agree
with, it is far more difficult to choose a different Internet provider”).
74
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.”).
75
Id. § 46(a).
76
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 70.
77
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
78
Id. § 45(n).
79
See id. § 45(a) (“Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices;
inapplicability to foreign trade.”). The FTC has defined an unfair practice as, inter alia, a
deceptive practice or one that “creates a serious consumer injury,” which must be
substantial, and may include a practice that “does a small harm to a large number of
people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.” Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1064, 1073 n.12 (1984); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d
246, 251 (6th Cir. 1973).
80
See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012);
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
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(“FCRA”) applies to the collection of individual consumer
information, and oversees the “[a]ccuracy and fairness of credit
reporting.”81 The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to enforce any
violations of the FCRA.82 Although certain types of information
like health and financial data are subject to heightened security
requirements, there is no set statute that provides general datasecurity for back-office and other administrative operations
involving personal information.83 Accordingly, if an IoT provider
violates the FCRA then a consumer might have a claim under that
particular statute that is enforceable through the FTC Act.
For example, the FTC filed its first IoT related claim against
TRENDnet in 2013, an IoT company that provided home webcam
services, for failing to provide sufficient security measures to

(2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
81
See FCRA § 1681(a) (“Congress makes the following findings: (1) The banking
system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports
directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods
undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the
banking system.”).
82
The FCRA provides that:
It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements
of this subchapter.
§ 1681(b). Furthermore, according to the FTC:
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan
institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit
unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers
subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air
carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
83
See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 922 (2006).
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prevent hackers from intercepting access to its equipment.84
TRENDnet provided “cameras for consumers to conduct security
monitoring of their homes or businesses, by accessing live video
and audio feeds (‘live feeds’) from their [Internet Protocol (‘IP’)]
cameras over the Internet.”85 The FTC found that TRENDnet
misrepresented its security measures, and failed to supply
“reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive
information.”86 Hackers “compromised live feeds display[ing]
private areas of users’ homes and allowed the unauthorized
surveillance of infants sleeping in their cribs, young children
playing, and adults engaging in typical daily activities.”87 The FTC
relied, in part, on the deception prong of the FTC Act because the
FTC claimed that TRENDnet violated its own statements made
to consumers.88
However, enforcement under the FTC Act for a company’s
general statements to consumers regarding security is typically
difficult because it relies on a company “having made overly
strong security-related promises to the public.”89 Since the security
breach exposed sensitive information, the FTC determined that
consumers’ diminished ability to control the dissemination of their
personal information resulted in significant harm.90 The FTC
recommended an updated and comprehensive security program, a
new notice requirement, and a provision requiring TRENDnet to
provide users with updated software to prevent the harm that the
company had promised to secure consumers against.91

84
See Complaint at 1–4, TRENDnet, Inc., No. 122-3090, 2013 WL 4858250 (F.T.C.
Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter TRENDnet Complaint].
85
Id. at 2.
86
Id. at 4. “[TRENDnet] described the IP cameras as ‘secure’ or suitable for
maintaining security, including through . . . a sticker affixed to the cameras’
packaging . . . which displays a lock icon and the word ‘security.’” Id. at 3.
87
Id. at 5.
88
Id. at 6.
89
Peppet, supra note 35, at 136.
90
See TRENDnet Complaint, supra note 84, at 6.
91
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges
Against TRENDnet, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases
/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc [https://perma.cc
/9MSV-95NW] [hereinafter TRENDnet Press Release].
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Most recently, the FTC filed a complaint against the Taiwanbased computer networking equipment manufacturer D-Link,
alleging that the company failed to take reasonable steps to secure
its wireless routers and IP cameras.92 According to Jessica Rich,
Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, “[h]ackers
are increasingly targeting consumer routers and IP cameras—and
the consequences for consumers can include device compromise
and exposure of their sensitive personal information.”93 The
complaint alleged that D-Link hard-coded login credentials into the
camera software, thereby allowing access to consumers’ live video
and audio feeds; left users’ login credentials unsecured on its
mobile apps; and mishandled its own key code, allowing it to be
public for six months.94 Additionally, D’Link’s “command
injection flaws . . . allow[ed] remote attackers to gain control of
consumers’ devices,”95 and was “a known vulnerability that lets
attackers take control of people’s routers and send them
unauthorized commands.”96
However, is FTC regulation over IoT providers trending
toward deregulation or nonenforcement or deregulation through
nonenforcement? Is this a distinction without a difference?
Deregulation at this early stage of moving toward developing a
cogent body of law that addresses IoT security issues would allow
the market to dictate expectations rather than lawmakers and the
courts. Earlier this year, the FTC voted two-to-one to authorize
filing the complaint against D-Link; however, the acting FTC
Commissioner, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, voted against the action.97
92

See Complaint at 5, FTC v. D-Link Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00039 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
2017) [hereinafter D-Link Complaint].
93
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges D-Link Put Consumers’ Privacy
at Risk Due to the Inadequate Security of Its Computer Routers and Cameras (Jan. 5,
2017) (alteration to original), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc
-charges-d-link-put-consumers-privacy-risk-due-inadequate
[https://perma.cc/5BJQ68GJ] [hereinafter D-Link Press Release].
94
D-Link Complaint, supra note 92, at 5.
95
Id.
96
Lesley Fair, D-Link Case Alleges Inadequate Internet of Things Security Practices,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan 5, 2017 1:04 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs
/business-blog/2017/01/d-link-case-alleges-inadequate-internet-things-security
[https://perma.cc/UV9U-AKUE].
97
D-Link Press Release, supra note 93.
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In 2014, the FTC voted unanimously to authorize filing the
complaint against TRENDnet.98 Recently, Commissioner
Ohlhausen said that the FTC is “not primarily a regulator[,]” and
the agency adopted a wait-and-see approach because there had
been no real harm to consumers, despite the recent holdings in the
TRENDnet and D-Link cases.99 Although Congress has attempted
to incentivize technology companies to adopt best practices,100 the
new trend in federal deregulation might just rewind the clock on
the federal regulatory progress of IoT-related oversight.
The FTC has also brought claims against companies under the
unfairness prong,101 under which the FTC must demonstrate that a
company’s unfair practice caused or is likely to cause substantial
harm to consumers.102 With respect to financial and healthcarerelated information, it is clear that the FTC has authority over such
claims.103 Unlike hidden telephone fees that accumulate and are
traceable and predictable,104 data security does not provide such a
salient trail of bread crumbs. Although the FTC has prevailed in
such actions,105 the FTC’s authority over data security
requirements is limited, and would benefit from legislative action.

98

TRENDnet Press Release, supra note 91.
Thielman, supra note 55 (noting Ohlhausen also said “We’re saying not ‘Let’s
speculate about harm five years out,’ but ‘Is there something happening that harms
consumers right now or is likely to cause harm to consumers’”).
100
Data Breach Insurance Act, H.R. 6032, 114th Cong. § 45S (2016) (proposing to give
a fifteen percent tax credit to companies that purchase data breach insurance coverage,
and adopt the National Institute of Standard and Technology’s voluntary
cybersecurity framework).
101
See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2015); LabMD,
Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015); DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 120
(2006); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 468 (2005).
102
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
103
See generally Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy:
Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 809, 829–30 (2011); Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian
Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 673, 688–89 (2013).
104
See, e.g., FTC v. Inc21.com Corp., 745 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 106 (9th Cir. 2012).
105
See, e.g., Wyndham Worldwide, 799 F.3d at 245–47 (holding that Wyndham’s
alleged failure to maintain reasonable and appropriate data security, if proven, could
constitute an unfair method of competition in commerce).
99
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Notably, several European countries are ahead of the
regulatory curve of IoT oversight. In Germany and Norway, a
seemingly innocuous blonde-hair blue-eyed doll named “Cayla”
was banned.106 Cayla is a smart and interactive fashion doll that
many critics suggest is ripe for a security breach, revealing
intimate details of its child-users, especially since the “voice
recordings are stored and used for a variety of purposes beyond
providing for the toys’ functionality.”107 As the number of devices
that data is gathered and stored in increases, so does the
opportunity for a security breach.108 In the United States, however,
Cayla is free to enter the bedrooms of children whose parents are
willing to fork over thirty-seven dollars.109 The glaring difference
between the United States and Germany is that German privacy
laws are consolidated, while U.S. privacy laws are scattered among
several agencies.110 And as many of these agencies lose control in
the oversight of IoT devices,111 consumers will be left vulnerable
to serious privacy invasions by devices with staggeringly weak
encryption.112 By consolidating federal regulations and
establishing minimum standards, IoT developers would have
clearer guidelines to adhere to before entering the market—similar
to lawmakers in Germany.113 Ultimately, federal regulatory
106

Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, The Bright-Eyed Talking Doll That Just Might Be a Spy,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/technology/caylatalking-doll-hackers.html?emc=edit_th_20170219&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid
=58756048&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7QBN-XYL2].
107
Id.
108
See, e.g., id.
109
Genesis, My Friend Cayla Doll ([U.S.] Version), Incl. Mirror & Comb, 18” Tall,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Genesis-Toys-Friend-Interactive-Fashion/dp
/B010T4JV5G [https://perma.cc/7XSA-C4TF] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
110
See Daniel Dimov, Differences Between the Privacy Laws in the EU and the US,
INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacylaws-in-eu-and-us/#gref [https://perma.cc/VV4V-VU6C].
111
See, e.g., Cosgrove, supra note 68.
112
See Lucian Constantin, Popular Internet-of-Things Devices Aren’t Secure,
COMPUTERWORLD (July 30, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article
/2490587/networking/popular-internet-of-things-devices-aren-t-secure.html
[https://perma.cc/TTR7-4RKW].
113
See Tim Wybitul & Dr. Wolf-Tassilo Bohm, German Parliament Passes New
Federal Data Protection Act, CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (May 2, 2017),
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2017/05/articles/consumer-privacy/german-parliamentpasses-new-federal-data-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/GX29-W6ZZ] (discussing
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oversight is the best way to address IoT data breaches that threaten
privacy because it would provide clarity, settle expectations, and
provide sufficient data security for consumers.
B. Expanding Data Breach Notifications
In light of these challenges, the existing federal data-breach
notification laws should be expanded to include the IoT. According
to Professor Scott R. Peppet, “a state could simply alter the
definition of ‘personal information’ in their data-breach statute to
include name plus biometric or other sensor-based data such as,
but not necessarily limited to, information from fitness and health
sensor devices; automobile sensors; home appliance, electricity,
and other sensors; and smartphone sensors.”114 This approach
would maintain the current practice “of applying data-breach
notification statutes only to already-identified datasets . . . that
include name[s] or other clearly identifying information.”115 This
practical approach focuses on the type of information that an IoT
device gathers, and would not interfere with the necessity of IoT
developers’ pragmatic market-reasons for collecting individual
data,
thereby
maintaining
individual
privacy
and
116
market efficiency.
The policy behind expanding data-breach notification laws to
include IoT would serve the same purpose as it does for digital
data. Disclosing IoT data breaches to the public serves a
“reputational sanction” function, allowing consumers to mitigate
harm from data breaches.117 This expansion also affords a market
mechanism to address data security, rather than an administrative
Germany’s privacy laws under their forty-year old Federal Data Protection Act
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz—(“BDSG”)), which provides security minimums for
developers to comply with, along with hefty fines for any violations).
114
Peppet, supra note 35, at 158.
115
Id.
116
See Adam Thierer, Relax and Learn to Love Big Data, U.S. NEWS (Sep. 16, 2013,
12:10 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/09/16
/big-data-collection-has-many-benefits-for-internet-users (on file with Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) (discussing the benefits of big
data on consumers like “language translation tools, mobile traffic services, digital
mapping technologies, spam and fraud detection tools, instant spell-checkers,” and
targeted consumer marketing).
117
Schwartz & Janger, supra note 83, at 918.
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mechanism,118 as this approach would provide a check on IoT
device manufacturers.119 Companies, developers, and corporate
counsel have all shown that they take the reputational
consequences of data-breach notification seriously because it
affects their products.120 For example, California has already
issued general guidance on Internet data, as discussed in the
following section.121 Thus, legislators would need to specifically
define personal information with respect to IoT devices’ datacollecting capabilities. Nevertheless, the states should enact
legislation to fill in the federal gaps.
C. After the Gold Rush: California on the IoT Data-Security
and Privacy
The federal government’s scattered sectoral approach to digital
privacy issues has forced many states to address growing digital
privacy issues, thus creating a patchwork of uncertainty.122 In New
York, legislators have adopted potent measures to ensure that
financial companies protect consumer data.123 However, California
is one of forty-six states to enact data-breach notification laws,124
118

Compare Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of
Information Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 66 (2011) (noting that data-protection laws help mitigate market
tensions between “consumer protection and corporate compliance cost minimization”),
with Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1545
(2013) (identifying an administrative law approach to data security). See generally Calo,
supra note 50 (discussing the concept of “market manipulation”).
119
See Burdon, supra note 118, at 66.
120
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 275 (2010) (“[E]very single respondent mentioned . . . the
enactment of state data breach notification statutes[] as an important driver of privacy in
corporations.” (citation omitted)).
121
See generally OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROT., CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL
INFORMATION 8–14 (2007).
122
See Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through
a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 52 (2015).
123
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017) (noting the need to establish
regulatory minimum standards in order to resolve cybersecurity issues in the financial
services industry).
124
ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-545 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (2017); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (West 2016); CONN. GEN.
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not to mention a myriad of privacy regulations.125 The California
statute provides:
Any agency that maintains computerized data that
includes personal information that the agency does
STAT. § 36a-701b (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 12B-102 (2005), amended by Act of Aug. 17, 2017, ch. 129, sec. 1, § 12B-102, 81 Del.
Laws (effective Apr. 14, 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568 (Westlaw through 2017 1st
Reg. Sess. & 25th Leg., Spec. “A” Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (2017); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 487N-1–487N-7 (Westlaw through 2017 1st Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE.
§ 28-51-105 (2017); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/10–530/12 (West, Westlaw through P.A.
100-535); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1–24-4.9-3-2 (2017); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 715C.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074 (2005)
(effective Jan. 1, 2006), http://legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=322030 [https://perma.cc
/AEH4-K8LT]; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1348 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW.
§§ 14-3501–14-3508 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.), amended by Personal
Protection Act, ch. 518, sec. 1, §§ 14-501–508, 2017 Md. Laws 2755, 3080–89 (2017)
(effective Jan. 1, 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, §§ 1–6 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2017); MINN. STAT.
§ 325E.61 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-29 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500
(2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803 (2017); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (West, Westlaw through 79th Legis. Sess.); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-163 (West, Westlaw through L.2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney,
Westlaw through Leg. 2017, ch. 1–402); N.C. GEN. STAT ANN. § 75-65 (2017); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 51-30-02–51-30-03 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 65th
Legis. Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19 (Westlaw through 2017
File 23 of the 132nd Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018) & 2017 State Issue 1); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 74, § 3113.1 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.604 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(effective through Oct. 6, 2017); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–2308, 2329 (2005); 11 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-4 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-2107 (2017); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (West 2015); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-44-202 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2017), http://legislature
.vermont.gov/statutes/section/09/062/02435 [https://perma.cc/845D-869N]; VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2–186.6 (2017); id. § 32.1–127.1:05 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010
(2017); id. § 42.56.590 (2017); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2A-101–46A-2A-105 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 2d Extraordinary); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-12-502 (2017).
125
See Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West
2017); Digital Privacy Rights for Minors, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–22582
(Deering 2017); Student Online Personal Information Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 22584–22585 (West 2017); Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware
Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 2017); Medical Apps Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 56.06 (West 2014), amended by Act of Oct. 7, 2017, ch. 561, sec. 17,
§ 56.06, 27, 2017 Cal. Leg. Serv. 1, 27–28 (West); Cyber Exploitation Act, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1708.85 (2014), amended by Act of Sept. 11, 2017, ch. 233, sec. 1, § 1708.85(f),
2017 Cal. Leg. Serv. 1, 2–4 (West) & CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 502.–502.01, 647(j), 647.8,
786 (West 2017); CAL. GOV. CODE § 11015.5 (West 2017).
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not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the
information of any breach of the security of the data
immediately following discovery, if the personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, acquired by an unauthorized person.126
Personal information has either of two meanings. First, it
means an individual’s first name or first initial and last name, in
combination with any of the following data elements: social
security number, driver’s license number, financial account
number, medical information, or health insurance information.127
Second, it means a username or e-mail address, in combination
with a password or security question and answer that would permit
online access of information.128 However, personal information
does not include “publicly available information that is lawfully
made available to the general public from federal, state, or local
government records.”129
Defining and identifying data as personal or public is a start.
For example, consider fitness and health related data: This likely
qualifies as personal information, and is therefore protected under
California statute, in part, because it is not publicly available.130 As
Professor Peppet suggested,131 perhaps all of the data collected by
IoT devices could be considered data that is related to health and
fitness under the California statutory scheme.132 For example,
teakettles, pillboxes, and HVAC systems all implicate an
individual’s health-related habits, since they demonstrate the user’s
dietary habits, medical issues, and environmental surroundings.133
Notwithstanding smart city devices and industrial devices,
126

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A).
128
Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(B).
129
Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(4).
130
See Peppet, supra note 35, at 139.
131
See id. at 158.
132
See id. With the exclusion of IoT devices such as bridge sensors, and other devices
that do not monitor an individual’s behavior.
133
Cf. Sam Thielman & Elle Hunt, Cyber Attack: Hackers ‘Weaponised’ Everyday
Devices with Malware, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2016/oct/22/cyber-attack-hackers-weaponised-everyday-devices-withmalware-to-mount-assault [https://perma.cc/4QGY-PNR9] (discussing the sensitive
information stored in everyday items such as teakettles).
127
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personally identifiable IoT devices within the home likely provide
insight into an individual user’s health-related information.134
Thus, defining IoT devices that encompass such broad healthrelated information—which is already protected under existing
statutes—may provide legislators with the means to include more
stringent protection for IoT data, and ultimately, the privacy of
its users.
Furthermore, the California Online Privacy Protection Act
(“CalOPPA”) provides, in part, that website operators could be
subject to legal action for failing to meet the standards outlined in
the Act, which determine how a website operator must post their
privacy policies.135 CalOPPA was recently amended to require that
privacy policies also identify the categories of personally
identifiable information collected, and with what third parties that
information will be shared.136 Much like the FTC, CalOPPA is
enforced by a separate Act known as the Business and Professions
Code section 17200,137 which provides the same causes of action
as the FTC Act under either an unlawful or unfair prong.138
California also provides similar guidance material on privacy
notifications for emerging technology providers, although it is
not enforceable.139
134

See, e.g., Marc Ambasna-Jones, The Smart Home and a Data Underclass,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media-network
/2015/aug/03/smart-home-data-underclass-internet-of-things
[https://perma.cc/GU9XEXSR] (discussing the benefits and perils of insurance companies gathering personal
home data, and providing discounts or higher premiums depending on domestic habits).
135
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2017).
136
See A.B. 370, 2013 (Cal. 2013).
137
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017); id. §§ 22575–22579; CARTLON A.
VARNER & THOMAS D. NEVINS, CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1–2
(3d ed. 2003) (noting that the California Supreme Court recognized section 17200 as the
“little FTC Act”).
138
See BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (“[U]nfair competition shall mean and
include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”).
139
See generally, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR
PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL
PRIVACY POLICY (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity
/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/73J9-GT5D] (including
guidelines on how to “[m]ake it easy for a consumer to find the section in which you
describe your policy regarding online tracking by labeling it”).
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Despite California’s innovative strides toward regulating
emerging technologies, it is still not prepared for the emerging
privacy and security risks associated with the IoT. For example,
IoT devices may not necessarily come shipped with privacy
policies directly attached to the devices.140 Additionally, IoT
developers are rushing devices to the market, which are poorly
equipped to provide adequate security.141 Consumers will not be
able to familiarize themselves with the device’s privacy policies, or
know if IoT providers are sharing their personal information and
with whom, let alone enforce their purported privacy rights.
However, this may be changing. While CalOPPA may fail to
keep pace with the IoT, California legislators are making strides to
address the security issues that the IoT presents. Introduced by
California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Senate Bill 327 would
require manufacturers selling connected devices to be equipped
with “reasonable security features appropriate to the nature of the
device and the information it may collect . . . that protect the
device and any information contained therein from unauthorized
access.”142 Further, the bill would require that manufacturers notify
consumers of “whether [a device] is capable of collecting audio,
video, location, biometric, health, or other personal or sensitive
user information if . . . not otherwise indicated by the
140

See, e.g., Bernard Marr, What Is the Internet of Things—A Complete Beginner’s
Guide in 2017, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bernardmarr/2017/04/10/what-is-the-internet-of-things-a-complete-beginners-guide-in2017/#5ca75fc25982 [https://perma.cc/KU7K-76BK] (characterizing the Amazon Echo
as an IoT device); Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help
/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 [https://perma.cc/36KU-DNR6] (last updated
Oct. 24, 2017) (providing terms of use and privacy policy on Amazon’s website and not
on the actual device); see also Jonathon Hauenschild, Lawmakers Must Clarify Privacy
Protections for the Internet of Things, HILL (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com
/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/312968-lawmakers-must-clarify-privacy-protections-forthe-internet-of [https://perma.cc/33LL-QCDB].
141
See Gareth Corfield, Fix Crap Internet of Things Security, Booms Internet Daddy
Cerf, REGISTER (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/21/vint
_cerf_internet_things_security/ [https://perma.cc/DB38-MTGD] (“The biggest worry
[Vint Cerf has] is that people building [IoT] devices will grab a piece of open source
software or operating system and just jam it into the device and send it out into the wild
without giving adequate thought and effort to securing the system and providing
convenient user access to those devices.”).
142
S.B. 327, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
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packaging . . . .”143 It would also require manufacturers to “obtain
consumer consent before it collects or transmits information
beyond what is necessary in order to fulfill a user transaction or
for the stated functionality of the connected device . . . .”144
In fact, California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson used Cayla—
the same cute little doll that drew the ire of German policymakers—as an example of why this piece of legislation is so
important.145 While the bill provides precisely the types of security
measures that would secure consumer data with respect to IoT
devices, at the moment, the California Senate cannot seem to push
it through.146 Many privacy-interest and public-interest groups
support the bill, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation,147
while its opponents—including the California Chamber of
Commerce—spent over ten million dollars lobbying against the
bill.148 Ultimately, it was short on votes and will likely face further
revision—possibly even removing its most important
safeguards.149 Nevertheless, Part III discusses recent examples of
why it might be necessary for California to push forward on Senate
Bill 327 to move toward securing IoT devices, and provide a
model for other states and perhaps even federal regulations.
III.

SECURITY BREACHES AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY
IN THE IOT
It is happening again. The rise of IoT malware is reminiscent of
the viruses, worms, and e-mail spam that crippled early Internet
users, because most personal computers were not adequately
secured, and companies that rushed to enter the market ignored or

143

Id.
Id.
145
See Dan Morain, This Cute Doll Can Spy on Your Kid. Why Doesn’t the Legislature
Seem to Care?, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com
/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/dan-morain/article155217209.html [https://perma.cc/7MSF72E9]; see also supra Section II.A.
146
See Morain, supra note 145.
147
See id.; see also S.B. 327, Reg. Sess.
148
See Morain, supra note 145.
149
See id.
144
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did not understand the need for Internet security.150 The same is
true now for the IoT. This Part argues that IoT devices have, in
fact, harmed consumers, and that merely permitting IoT developers
to oversee and develop their own best practices will leave users
vulnerable to dangerous IoT attacks and privacy breaches.
Several scholars have urged lawmakers to permit the IoT to
develop with relatively little oversight.151 However, the TRENDnet
and D-Link cases notwithstanding, the IoT has profoundly
impacted individual privacy in other areas besides live-stream
interception.152 For example, an Ohio man was arrested and
convicted of arson after the police examined his heart monitor’s
recorded data.153 A cardiologist reviewed the data that the police
retrieved from the man’s heart monitor, and concluded that he
could not have been in the home during the fire, which was
contrary to the Ohio man’s initial statements to the police.154 The
cardiologist said that it was “‘highly improbable’ that a person
with [his] medical condition could collect and remove the items in
such a short period of time.”155 Although this data is retrievable
under other legal theories in cases of criminal investigations, this
case illustrates the highly intrusive nature of IoT devices and their
effect on the legal landscape.
Furthermore, the IoT is vulnerable to security breaches.156
Consider the Ohio man with the IoT heart monitor. Perhaps the
data that IoT providers monitor, store, and stream is unsecure like
the live-streams in TRENDnet. Such unfettered access to personal
and private information is not only offensive, it is also potentially
150
Lily Hay Newman, The Botnet That Broke the Internet Isn’t Going Away, WIRED
(Dec. 9, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isntgoing-away/ [https://perma.cc/3VZW-WFYG].
151
See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 59, at 118 (discussing the negative impact that
regulation would have on innovation).
152
Debra Cassens Weiss, Data on Man’s Pacemaker Led to His Arrest on Arson
Charges, ABA J. (Feb. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/data
_on_mans_pacemaker_led_to_his_arrest_on_arson_charges/?utm_source=maestro&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/73HL-C894].
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See generally Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing
Benefits Through Consumer Control, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 210–12 (2014).
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physically dangerous. Suppose a hacker was able to intercept the
data streaming from the man’s heart monitor and interpret it to
track patterns associated with his heart rate. The hacker now has
the ability to track the man’s physical presence and state at any
given moment—for example, the hacker could determine if the
man was asleep or out for a jog—and potentially perpetrate a
physical crime. Thus, as the IoT links the Internet back into the
physical world, IoT hacks can and will have physical implications.
What seems clear is that a single vulnerable IoT device opens
up a number of vulnerabilities in all other IoT devices connected
through the same network.157 In particular, most IoT devices are,
and will continue to be, connected through home Wi-Fi networks,
which are easy to breach.158 So if one device connected to your
home network is inadequately protected, a hacker could use that
device to breach your entire network, and thereby compromise
other IoT devices and non-IoT devices connected to the same
network, like laptops and cellphones.159 Furthermore, consumers
connect their IoT devices through their home routers, which are
notoriously unprotected160 and pose a serious security risk.161
Many existing devices and new IoT devices have minimal
157

See Atzori et al., supra note 19, at 2787 (“The basic idea of this concept is the
pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects—such as . . . [RFID] tags,
sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing schemes, are
able to interact with each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach
common goals.”).
158
See Verizon Launches National IoT Network, YAHOO FIN. (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/verizon-launches-national-iot-network-162100012.html
[https://perma.cc/HYL9-JM4U] (noting that IoT devices will be linked predominantly
by Wi-Fi).
159
See Dan Goodin, [Twelve] Million Home and Business Routers Vulnerable to
Critical Hijacking Hack, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 18, 2014), https://arstechnica.com
/information-technology/2014/12/12-million-home-and-business-routers-vulnerable-tocritical-hijacking-hack/ [https://perma.cc/24LU-MZH5]. See generally Pageler, supra
note 39.
160
See Dan Goodin, supra note 159; Brian Krebs, Lizard Stresser Runs on Hacked
Home Routers, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jan. 15, 2015), http://krebsonsecurity.com
/2015/01/lizard-stresser-runs-on-hacked-home-routers/ [https://perma.cc/8WEC-EVMQ].
161
See Bruce Schneier, Security Risks of Embedded Systems, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Jan. 9, 2014, 6:33 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/security_risks
_9.html [https://perma.cc/3SH8-YLGG] (“[H]undreds of millions of devices that have
been sitting on the Internet, unpatched and insecure, for the last five to ten years . . . . We
have an incipient disaster in front of us. It’s just a matter of when.”).
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protection against security breaches.162 Accordingly, IoT devices
connected through home routers are low-hanging fruit
for hackers.163
The recent large-scale DDoS attacks on IoT devices may be a
harbinger of even more widespread attacks to come, at the
frontlines of which are Bots.164 Bots can steal data, send spam, and
intercept devices, all of which gum-up a network to slow it down,
while holding the server hostage and gaining sensitive user-data.165
There are several types of Bots, but this Article focuses on a very
recent and pugnacious manifestation employed to disable IoT
devices: “Mirai.”166
In September and October 2016, DDoS attacks on several IoT
devices used the infamous Mirai botnet.167 Daniel Miessler,
162

See Cameron Abbott & Giles Whittaker, Is Your IoT Device Putting You at Risk?
Internet of Things, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/article
/your-iot-device-putting-you-risk-internet-things [https://perma.cc/R3CF-V5EV] (“A
Tripwire study found [ninety-six percent] of surveyed IT pros expect to see an increase in
security attacks on IoT.”).
163
See Newman, supra note 150 (explaining that attacks on IoT devices are
“‘accelerating because there’s a wide-open, unprotected landscape that people can go to,’
says Chris Carlson, [V]ice [P]resident of product management at Qualys. ‘It’s a gold rush
to capture these devices for botnets.’”); see also John Leyden, Sh . . . IoT Just Got Real:
Mirai Botnet Attacks Targeting Multiple ISPs, REGISTER (Dec. 2, 2016, 12:19 AM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/12/02/broadband_mirai_takedown_analysis/
[https://perma.cc/SUC8-W78U].
164
See Bots, the Next Frontier, ECONOMIST (Apr. 9, 2016), https://www.economist.com
/news/business-and-finance/21696477-market-apps-maturing-now-one-text-basedservices-or-chatbots-looks-poised [https://perma.cc/2Y4E-NQMB] (discussing the
impending importance of bots and chatbots—a type of bot dedicated to learning and
applying language in user applications).
165
See Paul Sabanal, Thingbots: The Future of Botnets in the Internet of Things,
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 20, 2016), https://securityintelligence.com/thingbots-thefuture-of-botnets-in-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma.cc/MJ7P-X853].
166
See generally Tony Bradley, How Amazon Echo Users Can Control Privacy,
FORBES (Jan. 5, 2017, 12:12PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/01
/05/alexa-is-listening-but-amazon-values-privacy-and-gives-you-control/#59268c327ee6
[https://perma.cc/8B2R-AGAJ] (“‘Privacy and security of IoT is big right now following
recent attacks like the Mirai botnet and malware targeting specific brands of smart TVs,’
declared Cris Thomas, a respected security expert and spokesperson for Tenable
Network Security.”).
167
See Chris Williams, Today the Web Was Broken by Countless Hacked Devices –
Your [Sixty]-Second Summary, REGISTER (Oct. 21, 2016, 9:45 PM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/21/dyn_dns_ddos_explained/
[https://perma.cc
/DRU8-XBKK] (“Mirai spreads across the web, growing its ranks of obeying zombies,
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Director of Advisory Services at IOActive commented, “The
current state of IoT security is in bad shape, and will get a whole
lot worse before it gets any better. The Mirai botnet, which is
powered by 100,000 IoT devices that are insecure by default, is
just the most obvious and topical example.”168 The Mirai botnet is
incredibly pernicious—it is difficult to contain since it lurks on IoT
devices, and generally does not noticeably affect devices’
performance.169 Unlike early IoT-like devices, the IoT runs on
traditional IPs, which are notoriously vulnerable to attack.170 Even
assuming the average IoT device user realized that something was
wrong, users have “no direct way to interface with the infected
product.”171 The average consumer does not know how to
troubleshoot—let alone fix—any potentially compromised devices.
Several copycat DDoS attacks have sprung from the Mirai
botnet attack.172 The BrickerBot penetrates IoT devices and then
spreads to non-IoT devices, thus infecting an entire network of
devices and programs connected to the breached IoT device.173
Additionally, the Amnesia botnet “exploits . . . remote code
execution vulnerability by scanning for, locating, and attacking
vulnerable systems.”174 What these DDoS attacks highlight is that
the IoT devices entering the market must come with adequate
security protocols.175 Accordingly, federal regulation that imposes

by logging into devices using their default, factory-set passwords via Telnet and SSH.
Because no one changes their passwords on their gizmos, Mirai can waltz in and take
over routers, CCTV cameras, digital video recorders, and so on.”).
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(Apr. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/05
/the-rise-of-open-source-malware-and-iot-security/#5a20f72e4080
[https://perma.cc/DAF3-WNZG].
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Newman, supra note 150.
172
See Constantin, supra note 12.
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John Leyden, ‘Amnesia’ IoT Botnet Feasts on Year-Old Unpatched Vulnerability,
REGISTER (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/07/amnesia_iot_botnet/
[https://perma.cc/Z4N9-HFTR].
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stricter guidelines on IoT developers before entering the market
would prevent future attacks.176
IV.
SOLUTIONS FOR DATA-SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE IOT
If the FTC is trending toward deregulating the IoT and IoT
purveyors are left to oversee themselves, then security and privacy
will surely remain vulnerable. Perhaps the only sure-fire way to
ensure the security of IoT devices and consumer privacy is to do it
yourself. This Part argues that businesses would benefit from a
self-imposed privacy-by-design scheme. Additionally, consumers
should rely on self-help methods to ensure their privacy and
security while also urging manufacturers to continue to utilize
established best practices. However, self-help measures could
negatively impact federal regulation of the IoT.
A. Privacy-by-Design in the IoT
The European Parliament and Council of Ministers has already
been working to incentivize companies to incorporate security
safeguards by-design177 in order to protect user privacy.178
Whereas the FTC:
[S]uggests companies follow a ‘defen[s]e in depth’
approach, considering security measures at several
different points in their systems, such as using
access control measures and encrypting data even
when users are making use of encrypted links to
home Wi-Fi routers (which will not protect the data

176

Even self-help would fall short of shoring up protections against sophisticated
botnets like Mirai. See infra Section IV; see also Kyle York, Dyn Statement on
10/21/2016 DDoS Attack, ORACLE + DYN (Oct. 22, 2016), http://dyn.com/blog/dynstatement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/ [https://perma.cc/7AC5-J9F6] (statement by Chief
Strategy Officer of Dyn, Kyle York, discussing the tens of millions of discrete IP
addresses associated with the Mirai botnet that were part of the attack).
177
See generally What Is Security by Design?, LOGICWORKS (Jan. 5, 2017),
http://www.logicworks.com/blog/2017/01/what-is-security-by-design/ [https://perma.cc
/8754-GDB8] (defining security by design as a standardized and controlled approach to
integrating security measurers into each product before it hits the market).
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between the router and the company’s servers, or if
the router is badly configured).179
In the United States, several companies have rolled out services
that have proven to be vulnerable to hacking and attacks.180 By
incorporating a by-design approach, companies would have to
rigorously test their services and products in order to enter the
market.181 For example, when a new product enters the market,
developers adhere to physical safety standards like seatbelts or
blade guards. Similarly, a tech company would adhere to privacy
safety standards when creating and designing a new device or
application. Although this approach may cost companies time and
money in developing a more secure service or product, it would
prevent serious privacy intrusion, and would ultimately benefit the
company by providing greater security against liability. Most
importantly, it would provide consumers with a choice of which
products and services to purchase with their privacy in mind.
The biggest boost in IoT security could come from simply
providing a stronger data encryption for devices right out of the
box. Data encryption is essentially a form of security that depends
on what is being protected.182 With respect to IoT, sensitive user
179
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See Nick Bilton, Keeping Your Car Safe From Electronic Thieves, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
15,
2015),
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With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015
/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ [https://perma.cc/M8W7-AW5P] (noting that
after an experiment demonstrated how easy it would be to hack into Jeep’s smart car,
Chrysler issued a recall for 1.4 million vehicles already on the road).
181
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https://iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPQ94AZH] (discussing the fundamental principles of privacy-by-design, which would require
developers to create and design new technology with privacy in mind, and intentionally
incorporate certain safeguards into new devices the same way that, for example,
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data needs to be protected. Similar to the existing dataencryption183 shielding personal information from the public, the
IoT must rely on—at a minimum—what consumers have come to
expect from their non-IoT devices—such as cellphones and
laptops—to provide a basic level of security through encryption.
However, many of the IoT devices that enter the market are not
equipped with what consumers have come to expect as a basic
level of cyber security.184
IoT developers should only be permitted to enter the market
after proving up adequate security measures because default device
encryption leaves IoT devices exposed to security breaches.185
Although the costs of creating and maintaining adequate security
will likely increase the prices of IoT devices entering the
market,186 the gains in security should be touted as a marketable
benefit to the consumer—a benefit that, in light of recent DDoS
attacks, should be just as important as the underlying service that a
particular IoT device provides. Accordingly, both IoT developers
and IoT users would benefit from clear design standards to ensure
an IoT device’s security. But if the market lags in dictating the
security measures that IoT developers take before entering the
market, perhaps consumers should take their data security and
privacy concerns into their own hands.

expected use of a particular device); Nate Lord, What is Data Encryption?, DIGITAL
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B. Self-Help: Blockchain Technology
There is a promising data security technology on the horizon.
Blockchain technology (“BT”) is a relatively new method of data
encryption that has only been applied in financial technology.187
Canadian programmer Vitalik Buterin describes BT as
“decentrali[z]ed autonomous organi[z]ations” that are sets of rules
for users to abide by,188 and envisions BT allowing IoT devices to
bypass registration and tracking.189 BT is considered by many
technology professionals and analysts to be the missing link to
ensure data privacy.190 BT essentially provides IoT providers with
a lock and key to data.191 BT can be used to track billions of IoT
devices, and process and coordinate between devices by
decentralizing the data.192 Decentralization, along with stronger
encryption, would provide stronger data security, thereby
providing IoT users with more privacy.193 There are companies
cropping up all over the world that are developing BT’s application
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(May 27, 2016, 2:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/05/27/howblockchain-technology-could-change-the-world/#3a76d254725b
[https://perma.cc/L5LG-UAPG].
188
The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677228-technology-behind-bitcoin-letspeople-who-do-not-know-or-trust-each-other-build-dependable
[https://perma.cc/FK36-R9MV].
189
See id. (“Further out, some talk of using the technology to make by-then-self-driving
cars self-owning, to boot. Such vehicles could stash away some of the digital money they
make from renting out their keys to pay for fuel, repairs and parking spaces, all according
to preprogrammed rules.”).
190
See, e.g., Mark van Rijmenam, What Is the Blockchain and Why Is It So Important?,
DATAFLOQ (Aug. 31, 2016), https://datafloq.com/read/what-is-the-blockchain-and-whyis-it-so-important/2270?utm=internal [https://perma.cc/468L-H4F5].
191
Rohini Samtani, Embracing the Internet of Things Doesn’t Necessarily Mean
Forfeiting Privacy, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/29/embracing
-the-internet-of-things-doesnt-necessarily-mean-forfeiting-privacy.html
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to IoT devices.194 Most famously, BT was part of the driving
technology that made Bitcoin so secure.195 IBM, Microsoft, and
many other service providers are also developing BT.196 In a recent
report, IBM suggested that attempting to monitor billions of IoT
devices centrally would make them vulnerable to hacking and
government surveillance.197
BT would also help to protect IoT devices from hackers and
DDoS attacks. Business and technology expert Ahmed Banafa
argues that there is an “urgent need for a secure IoT model to
perform common tasks such as sensing, processing, storage, and
communicating.”198 He argues that BT’s edge is that it is public,
and that everyone participating can see the blocks and any
transactions stored inside of the block.199 Although public, only
those users with a private key may access their own blocks.200
Since BT decentralizes all of the data, “there is no single authority
that can approve transactions or set specific rules to have
transactions accepted.”201 Although this decentralized data concept
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is based on trust among its users, it is touted as the most secure
response to privacy concerns for IoT devices.202
To be sure, BT is not without its flaws. Developers have raised
concerns with scalability issues, processing power and time,
storage, and legal and compliance issues that might scare off new
businesses from integrating BT into their IoT devices.203 At
present, such diverse types of IoT devices would make it difficult
to streamline BT.204 Since BT is decentralized, the blocks would
have to be housed in each individual IoT device; however, the
sensors for most IoT devices are too small and do not have enough
processing power.205 Additionally, many—if not most—consumers
may not have financial or informational access to such technology
to ensure their data privacy. Nevertheless, BT provides the most
promising prospect of securing data and promoting privacy
in the IoT.
C. Self-Help Could Negatively Impact Potential Regulation
Consumer-wide self-help might run the risk of negatively
impacting the policy that shapes eventual IoT regulation.206
Although imperfect, BT could privatize and decentralize datasecurity.207 Self-help measures like BT might run the risk of
loosening the expectations of IoT developers to provide safe and
secure IoT devices. Effectively, BT could provide enough security
that legislators may not need to regulate the IoT. Self-help should
remain a solution for consumers to combat the risks of datasecurity affecting privacy in an unregulated IoT world, without
shifting entirely the burden from IoT developers to the consumer.
But the complexity of the data-security and privacy issues from the
IoT may prove unpredictable for self-help measures like BT.
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Furthermore, BT is user-based and still susceptible to hacks.
Less than a year ago, Bitcoin was hacked for sixty-five million
dollars.208 While BT could provide strong encryption methods for
IoT users, a modicum of oversight would still be necessary to
address the data-security and privacy issues raised by IoT devices.
In order to secure IoT devices and promote digital privacy, FTC
regulations should include strict IoT developer oversight, and a
more expanded definition of personal information, to promote
effective data-breach notifications. This would not only promote
digital privacy, but it would also provide a minimum expectation
of individual privacy protection to IoT consumers. Accordingly,
even with effective self-help methods like BT soon to be available
to consumers, it may all be for naught unless regulators step in to
provide meaningful guidance.
CONCLUSION
While the benefits of the developing IoT and its related
technology provide a boon for users and the economy, it also
provides pitfalls and potential legal challenges. As this technology
develops and impacts daily life, it will be imperative to
consciously and carefully develop the law alongside it. First, IoT
developers should employ a privacy-by-design approach to their
IoT devices before entering the market, which would benefit both
developers and consumers. Second, perhaps California—among
other states—might lead the way to a workable regulatory
framework to ensure consumer data-security and privacy. With
enough success, perhaps federal regulations will follow states like
California, and streamline expectations for IoT developers and
users. Finally, despite the potential impact to federal regulations of
the IoT, consumers should protect their own data and privacy
interests through available self-help measures, like BT. Thus, even
though federal and state regulatory oversight would be ideal, until
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then, consumers and service providers could utilize self-help
methods like BT.

